

Globalization, International Relations, and Daily Life

International relations is a fascinating topic because it concerns peoples and cultures throughout the world. The scope and complexity of the interactions among these groups make international relations a challenging subject to master. There is always more to learn. This book is only the beginning of the story.

Narrowly defined, the field of **international relations (IR)** concerns the relationships among the world's governments. But these relationships cannot be understood in isolation. They are closely connected with other actors (such as international organizations, multinational corporations, and individuals); with other social structures and processes (including economics, culture, and domestic politics); and with geographical and historical influences. These elements together power the central trend in IR today—globalization.

Indeed, two key events of recent years reflect globalization. The young protesters of the Arab Spring who overthrew several governments in 2011–2012 used Facebook and cell phones to plan and coordinate their revolutions. And the global economic recession of 2008–2009, which began with a collapse of the U.S. home mortgage market, spread quickly to other nations. Highly integrated global financial markets created a ripple effect across the globe that is still being felt today. Thus, two hallmarks of globalization—expanding communications technology and integrated markets—propelled events that impacted our daily lives.

Not only large-scale events influence our lives. The prospects for getting jobs after graduation depend on the global economy and international economic competition. Those jobs also are more likely than ever to entail international travel, sales, or communication. And the rules of the world trading system affect the goods that students consume every day, such as electronics, clothes, and gasoline.

Globalization has distinct positive impacts on our daily lives as well. As technology advances, the world is shrinking year by year. Better communication and transportation capabilities constantly expand the ordinary person's contact with people, products, and ideas from other countries. Globalization is internationalizing us.

In addition to feeling the influence of globalization and international relations on our daily lives, individual citizens can influence the world as well. Often, international relations is portrayed as a distant and abstract ritual conducted by a small group of people such as presidents, generals, and diplomats. Although leaders do play a major role in international affairs, many other people participate. College students and other citizens participate in international relations every time they vote in an election or work on a political campaign, buy a product or service traded on world markets, and watch the news. The choices we make in our daily lives ultimately affect the world we live in. Through those choices, every person makes a unique contribution, however small, to the world of international relations.

The purpose of this book is to introduce the field of IR, to organize what is known and theorized about IR, and to convey the key concepts used by political scientists to discuss relations among nations. This first chapter defines IR as a field of study, introduces the actors of interest, and reviews the geographical and historical aspects of globalization within which IR occurs.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Globalization, International Relations, and Daily Life

- Core Principles
- IR as a Field of Study

Actors and Influences

- State Actors
- Nonstate Actors
- Levels of Analysis
- Globalization

Global Geography

The Evolving International System

- The Two World Wars, 1900–1950
- The Cold War, 1945–1990
- The Post–Cold War Era, 1990–2013

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TOUCHED BY WAR



IR affects our lives in many ways. This woman's boyfriend died in Iraq in 2006.

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interest in burning fossil fuels to keep its economy going. Similarly, all members of a military alliance benefit from the strength of the alliance, but each member separately has an interest in minimizing its own contributions in troops and money. Individual nations can advance their own short-term interests by seizing territory militarily, cheating on trade agreements, and refusing to contribute to international efforts such as peacekeeping or vaccination campaigns. But if all nations acted this way, they would find themselves worse off, in a chaotic and vicious environment where mutual gains from cooperating on issues of security and trade would disappear.

This problem of shared interests versus conflicting interests among members of a group goes by various names in various contexts—the problem of “collective action,” “free riding,” “burden sharing,” the “tragedy of the commons,” or the “prisoner’s dilemma.” We will refer to the general case as the **collective goods problem**, that is, the problem of how to provide something that benefits all members of a group regardless of what each member contributes to it.¹

In general, collective goods are easier to provide in small groups than in large ones. In a small group, the cheating (or free riding) of one member is harder to conceal, has a greater impact on the overall collective good, and is easier to punish. The advantage of small groups helps explain the importance of the great power system in international security affairs and of the G20 (Group of Twenty) industrialized countries in economic matters.²

¹Olson, Mancur. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Harvard, 1971 [1965].

²At the G20 meeting in 2009, leaders of the major industrial countries announced that the G20 would replace the G8 as the key group coordinating global financial matters.

Core Principles

The field of IR reflects the world’s complexity, and IR scholars use many theories, concepts, and buzzwords in trying to describe and explain it. Underneath this complexity, however, lie a few basic principles that shape the field. We will lay out the range of theories and approaches in Chapters 2 through 4, but here we will present the most central ideas as free from jargon as possible.

IR revolves around one key problem: How can a group—such as two or more countries—serve its *collective* interests when doing so requires its members to forgo their *individual* interests? For example, every country has an interest in stopping global warming, a goal that can be achieved only by many countries acting together. Yet each country also has an individual

The collective goods problem occurs in all groups and societies, but is particularly acute in international affairs because each nation is sovereign, with no central authority such as a world government to enforce on individual nations the necessary measures to provide for the common good. By contrast, in domestic politics *within* countries, a government can force individuals to contribute in ways that do not serve their individual self-interest, such as by paying taxes or paying to install antipollution equipment on vehicles and factories. If individuals do not comply, the government can punish them. Although this solution is far from perfect—cheaters and criminals sometimes are not caught, and governments sometimes abuse their power—it mostly works well enough to keep societies going.

Three basic principles—which we call dominance, reciprocity, and identity—offer possible solutions to the core problem of getting individuals to cooperate for the common good without a central authority to make them do so (see Table 1.1 on p. 8). These three principles are fundamental across the social sciences and recur in such disciplines as the study of animal societies, child development, social psychology, anthropology, and economics, as well as political science. To explain each principle, we will apply the three principles to a small-scale human example and an IR example.

Dominance The principle of **dominance** solves the collective goods problem by establishing a power hierarchy in which those at the top control those below—a bit like a government but without an actual government. Instead of fighting constantly over who gets scarce resources, the members of a group can just fight occasionally over position in the “status hierarchy.” Then social conflicts such as who gets resources are resolved automatically in favor of the higher-ranking actor. Fights over the dominance position have scripted rules that minimize, to some extent, the harm inflicted on the group members. Symbolic acts of submission and dominance reinforce an ever-present status hierarchy. Staying on top of a status hierarchy does not depend on strength alone, though it helps. Rather, the top actor may be the one most adept at forming and maintaining alliances among the group’s more capable members. Dominance is complex, and not just a matter of brute force.

In international relations, the principle of dominance underlies the great power system, in which a handful of countries dictate the rules for all the others. Sometimes a so-called *hegemon* or superpower stands atop the great powers as the dominant nation. The UN Security Council, in which the world’s five strongest military powers hold a veto, reflects the dominance principle.

The advantage of the dominance solution to the collective goods problem is that, like a government, it forces members of a group to contribute to the common good. It also minimizes open conflict within the group. However, the disadvantage is that this stability comes at a cost of constant oppression of, and resentment by, the lower-ranking members in the status hierarchy. Also, conflicts over position in the hierarchy can occasionally harm the group’s stability and well-being, such as when challenges to the top position lead to serious fights. In the case of international relations, the great power system and the hegemony of a superpower can provide relative peace and stability for decades on end but then can break down into costly wars among the great powers.

Reciprocity The principle of **reciprocity** solves the collective goods problem by rewarding behavior that contributes to the group and punishing behavior that pursues self-interest at the expense of the group. Reciprocity is very easy to understand and can be “enforced” without any central authority, making it a robust way to get individuals to cooperate for the common good.

But reciprocity operates in both the positive realm (“You scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours”) and the negative (“An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”). A disadvantage

TRAVEL COMPANIONS



Collective goods are provided to all members of a group regardless of their individual contributions, just as these migrant workers crossing the Sahara desert in Niger in 2006 all depend on the truck's progress even while perhaps jostling for position among themselves. In many issue areas, such as global warming, the international community of nations is similarly interdependent. However, the provision of collective goods presents difficult dilemmas as players seek to maximize their own share of benefits.

of reciprocity as a solution to the collective goods problem is that it can lead to a downward spiral as each side punishes what it believes to be negative acts by the other. Psychologically, most people overestimate their own good intentions and underestimate the value of the actions of their opponents or rivals. To avoid tit-for-tat escalations of conflict, one or both parties must act generously to get the relationship moving in a good direction.

In international relations, reciprocity forms the basis of most of the norms (habits; expectations) and institutions in the international system. Many central arrangements in IR, such as World Trade Organization agreements, explicitly recognize reciprocity as the linchpin of cooperation. For instance, if one country opens its markets to another's goods, the other opens its markets in return. On the negative side, reciprocity fuels arms races as

each side responds to the other's buildup of weapons. But it also allows arms control agreements and other step-by-step conflict-resolution measures, as two sides match each other's actions in backing away from the brink of war.

Identity A third potential solution to the collective goods problem lies in the identities of participants as members of a community. Although the dominance and reciprocity principles act on the idea of achieving individual self-interest (by taking what you can, or by mutually beneficial arrangements), the **identity** principle does not rely on self-interest. On the contrary, members of an identity community care about the interests of others in that community enough to sacrifice their own interests to benefit others. The roots of this principle lie in the close family, the extended family, and the kinship group. But this potential is not limited to the close family; it can be generalized to any identity community that one feels a part of. As members of a family care about each other, so do members of an ethnic group, a gender group, a nation, or the world's scientists. In each case, individual members will accept solutions to collective goods problems that do not give them the best deal as individuals, because the benefits are "all in the family," so to speak. A biologist retiring at a rich American university may give away lab equipment to a biologist in a poor country because they share an identity as scientists. A European Jew may give money to Israel because of a shared Jewish identity, or a computer scientist from India may return home to work for lower pay after receiving training in Canada, in order to help the community he or she cares about. Millions

of people contribute to international disaster relief funds after tsunamis, earthquakes, or hurricanes because of a shared identity as members of the community of human beings.

In IR, identity communities play important roles in overcoming difficult collective goods problems, including the issue of who contributes to development assistance, world health, and UN peacekeeping missions. The relatively large foreign aid contributions of Scandinavian countries, or the high Canadian participation in peacekeeping, cannot be explained well by self-interest, but arise from these countries' self-defined identities as members of the international community. Even in military forces and diplomacy (where dominance and reciprocity, respectively, rule the day), the shared identities of military professionals and of diplomats—each with shared traditions and expectations—can take the edge off conflicts. And military alliances also mix identity politics with raw self-interest, as shown by the unusual strength of the U.S.-British alliance, which shared interests alone cannot explain as well as shared identity does.

Nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations or terrorist networks, also rely on identity politics to a great extent. The increasing roles of these actors—feminist organizations, churches, jihadists, and multinational corporations, for example—have brought the identity principle to greater prominence in IR theory in recent years.

An Everyday Example To sum up the three core principles, imagine that you have two good friends, a man and a woman, who are in a romantic relationship. They love each other and enjoy the other's company, but they come to you for help with a problem: When they go out together, the man likes to go to the opera, whereas the woman enjoys going to boxing matches.³ Because of your training in international relations, you quickly recognize this as a collective goods problem, in which the shared interest is spending time together and the conflicting individual interests are watching opera and watching boxing. (Of course, you know that the behavior of states is more complicated than that of individuals, but put that aside for a moment.) You might approach this problem in any of three ways.

First, you could say, "Traditionally, relationships work best when the man wears the pants. For thousands of years the man has made the decision and the woman has followed it. I suggest you do the same, and buy season tickets to the opera." This would be a dominance solution. It could be a very stable solution, if the woman cares more about spending time with her true love than she cares about opera or boxing. It would be a simple solution that would settle all future conflicts. It would give one party everything he wants, and the other party some of what she wants (love, company, a stable relationship). This might be better for both of them than spending all their evenings arguing about where to go out. On the other hand, this solution might leave the woman permanently resentful at the unequal nature of the outcome. She might feel her love for her partner diminish, over time, by a longing for respect and a nostalgia for boxing. She might even meet another man who likes her *and* likes boxing.




Second, you could say, "Look, instead of fighting all the time, why don't you establish a pattern and trade off going to boxing one time and opera the next." This would be a reciprocity solution. You could help the couple set up agreements, accounting systems, and shared expectations to govern the implementation of this seemingly simple solution. For example, they could go to boxing on Friday nights and opera on Saturday nights. But what if opera season is shorter than boxing season? Then perhaps they would go to opera more often during its season and boxing more often when opera is out of season. What if one of them is out of town on a Friday night? Does that night count anyway or does it earn a credit for later? Or does the one who is in town go out alone? What if the man *hates* boxing but the woman only mildly dislikes opera? Do you set up a schedule of two operas for each boxing match to keep each side equally happy or unhappy? Clearly, reciprocity solutions can become very complicated (just look at the world trade rules in Chapter 8, for

³This scenario is adopted from the game theory example "Battle of the Sexes."

example), and they require constant monitoring to see if obligations are being met and cheating avoided. Your friends might find it an irritant in their relationship to keep close track of who owes whom a night at the opera or at a boxing match.

Third, you could say, “Who cares about opera or boxing? The point is that you love each other and want to be together. Get past the superficial issues and strengthen the core feelings that brought you together. Then it won’t matter where you go or what you’re watching.” This would be an identity solution. This approach could powerfully resolve your friends’ conflict and leave them both much happier. Over time, one partner might actually begin to prefer the other’s favorite activity after more exposure—leading to a change in identity. On the other hand, after a while self-interest could creep back in, because that loving feeling might seem even happier with a boxing match (or opera) to watch. Indeed, one partner can subtly exploit the other’s commitment to get past the superficial conflicts. “What’s it matter as long as we’re together,” she says, “and oh, look, there’s a good boxing match tonight!” Sometimes the identity principle operates more powerfully in the short term than the long term: the soldier who volunteers to defend the homeland might begin to feel taken advantage of after months or years on the front line, and the American college student who gives money once to tsunami victims may not want to keep giving year after year to malaria victims.

TABLE 1.1 Core Principles for Solving Collective Goods Problems

| Principle | Advantages | Drawbacks |
|---|--|---|
|  Dominance | Order, Stability, Predictability | Oppression, Resentment |
|  Reciprocity | Incentives for Mutual Cooperation | Downward Spirals; Complex Accounting |
|  Identity | Sacrifice for Group, Redefine Interests | Demonizing an Out-Group |

SEEKING THE COLLECTIVE GOOD

Introduction

In explaining how countries behave in IR, a central concept is the “collective goods problem” (p. 4). This recurring problem results when two or more members of a group share an interest in some outcome of value to them all, but have conflicting individual interests when it comes to achieving that valued outcome. For example, the world’s countries share a desire to avoid global warming, but each one benefits from burning fossil fuels to run its economy. If a few members of a group fail to contribute to a collective good, the others will still provide it and the few can “free ride.” But if too many do so, then the collective good will not be provided for anyone. For instance, if too many countries burn too much fossil fuel, then the

whole world will suffer the effects of global warming.

Within domestic societies, governments solve collective goods problems by forcing the members of society to contribute to common goals, such as by paying taxes. In international affairs, no such world government exists. Three core principles—dominance, reciprocity, and identity—offer different solutions to the collective goods problem. These principles underlie the actions and outcomes that make up IR.



DOMINANCE



RECIPROCITY




IDENTITY

An IR Example Now consider the problem of nuclear proliferation. All countries share an interest in the collective good of peace and stability, which is hard to achieve in a world where more and more countries make more and more nuclear weapons. Within a society, if individuals acquire dangerous weapons, the government can take them away to keep everyone safe. But in the society of nations, no such central authority exists. In 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear bomb and Iran continues uranium enrichment that could lead to a nuclear bomb—defying UN resolutions in both cases.

One approach to nuclear proliferation legitimizes these weapons' ownership by just the few most powerful countries. The "big five" with the largest nuclear arsenals hold veto power on the UN Security Council. Through agreements like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Proliferation Security Initiative, the existing nuclear powers actively try to keep their exclusive hold on these weapons and prevent smaller nations from getting them. This is a dominance approach. In 2003, when the United States thought Iraq's Saddam Hussein might have an active nuclear weapons program, as he had a decade earlier, it invaded Iraq and overthrew its government. Similarly, in 1982, when Iraq had begun working toward a nuclear bomb, Israel sent jets to bomb Iraq's nuclear facility, setting back the program by years. One drawback to these dominance solutions is the resentment they create among the smaller countries. Those countries point to an unenforced provision of the NPT stating that existing nuclear powers should get rid of their own bombs as other countries refrain from making new ones. And they ask what gives Israel the right to bomb another country, or the United States the right to invade one. They speak of a "double standard" for the powerful and the weak.

Reciprocity offers a different avenue for preventing proliferation. It is the basis of the provision in the NPT about the existing nuclear powers' obligation to disarm in exchange for smaller countries' agreement to stay nonnuclear. Reciprocity also underlies arms control agreements, used extensively in the Cold War to manage the buildup of nuclear bombs by the superpowers, and used currently to manage the mutual reduction of their arsenals. Deterrence also relies on reciprocity. The United States warned North Korea in 2006 against selling its bombs (an action that would be in North Korea's short-term self-interest), threatening to retaliate against North Korea if any other actor used such a bomb

To help tie together a central topic in a chapter with the core principles used throughout the book, each chapter contains a Seeking the Collective Good box. Each box will discuss how the world's states deal with an important issue in IR using one (or more) of the core principles. Examples include stopping genocide (Chapter 7), enhancing world trade (Chapter 8), and slowing global warming (Chapter 11).



Aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, New Jersey, 2012. Global climate stability is a collective good.

against the United States. And when Libya gave up its nuclear weapons program in 2003, the international community gave it various rewards, including the ending of economic sanctions, in exchange.

The identity principle has proven equally effective against nuclear proliferation, if less newsworthy. Many nations that have the technical ability to make nuclear weapons have *chosen* not to do so. They have constructed their national identities in ways that shape their self-interests so as to make nuclear bombs undesirable. Some, like Sweden, do not intend to fight wars. Others, like Germany, belong to alliances in which they come under another nation's nuclear "umbrella" and do not need their own bomb. South Africa actually developed nuclear weapons in secret but then dismantled the program before apartheid ended, keeping the bomb out of the hands of the new majority-rule government. Nobody forced South Africa to do this (as in dominance), nor did it respond to rewards and punishments (reciprocity). Rather, South Africa's identity shifted. Similarly, Japan's experience of the catastrophic results of militarism, culminating in the destruction of two of its cities by nuclear bombs in 1945, continues generations later to shape Japan's identity as a country that does not want nuclear weapons, even though it has the know-how and even the stockpile of plutonium to make them.

Collective goods problems fascinate social scientists, and especially scholars of IR, precisely because they have no easy solutions. In later chapters, we will see how these three core principles shape the responses of the international community to various collective goods problems across the whole range of IR issues.

IR as a Field of Study

IR is a rather practical discipline. There is a close connection between scholars in colleges, universities, and think tanks and the policy-making community working in the government—especially in the United States. Some professors serve in the government (for instance, Professor Condoleezza Rice became national security advisor in 2001 and secretary of state in 2005 under President George W. Bush), and sometimes professors publicize their ideas about foreign policy through newspaper columns or TV interviews. Influencing their government's foreign policy gives these scholars a laboratory in which to test their ideas in practice. Diplomats, bureaucrats, and politicians can benefit from the knowledge produced by IR scholars.⁴

Theoretical debates in the field of IR are fundamental, but unresolved.⁵ It will be up to the next generation of IR scholars—today's college students—to achieve a better understanding of how world politics works. The goal of this book is to lay out the current state of knowledge without exaggerating the successes of the discipline.

As a part of political science, IR is about *international politics*—the decisions of governments about foreign actors, especially other governments.⁶ To some extent, however,

⁴Walt, Stephen M. The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, 2005: 23–48.

⁵Art, Robert J., and Robert Jervis, eds. *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*. 8th ed. Longman, 2006. Dougherty, James E., Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*. 5th ed. Longman, 2001. Doyle, Michael W. *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*. Norton, 1997.

⁶Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, eds. *Handbook of International Relations*. Sage, 2002. Waever, Ole. The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations. *International Organization* 52 (4), 1998: 687–727.

POLICY PERSPECTIVES

Overview

International policy makers confront a variety of problems every day. Solving these problems requires difficult decisions and choices. "Policy Perspectives" is a box feature in each chapter that places you in a particular decision-making perspective (for example, the prime minister of Great Britain) and asks you to make choices concerning an important international relations issue.

Each box contains four sections. The first, "Background," provides information about a political problem faced by the leader. This background information is factual and reflects real situations faced by these decision makers.

The second section, "Domestic Considerations," reflects on the implications of the situation for domestic politics within the leader's government and society. How will the lives of ordinary citizens be affected?

The third section, "Scenario," suggests a new problem or crisis confronting the leader. Although these crises are hypothetical, all are within the realm of possibility and would require difficult decisions by the leaders and their countries.

The fourth section, "Choose Your Policy," asks you to make a choice responding to the Scenario. With each

decision, think about the trade-offs between your options. What are the risks and rewards in choosing one policy over another? Do alternative options exist that could effectively address the problem within the given constraints? Does one option pose bigger costs in the short term, but fewer in the long term? Can you defend your decision to colleagues, the public, and other world leaders? How will your choice affect your citizens' lives and your own political survival?

As you consider each problem faced by the decision maker, try to reflect on the process and logic by which you have reached the decision. Which factors seem more important and why? Are domestic or international factors more important in shaping your decision? Are the constraints you face based on limited capability (for example, money or military power), or do international law or norms influence your decision as well? How do factors such as lack of time influence your decision?

You will quickly discover that there are often no "right" answers. At times, it is difficult to choose between two good options; at other times, one has to decide which is the least bad option.



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the field is interdisciplinary, relating international politics to economics, history, sociology, and other disciplines. Some universities offer separate degrees or departments for IR. Most, however, teach IR in political science classes, in which the focus is on the *politics* of economic relationships, or the *politics* of environmental management to take two examples. (The domestic politics of foreign countries, although overlapping with IR, generally make up the separate field of *comparative politics*.)

Political relations among nations cover a range of activities—diplomacy, war, trade relations, alliances, cultural exchanges, participation in international organizations, and so forth. Particular activities within one of these spheres make up distinct **issue areas** on which scholars and foreign policy makers focus attention. Examples of issue areas include global trade, the environment, and specific conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. Within each issue area, and across the range of issues of concern in any international relationship, policy makers of one nation can behave in a cooperative manner or a conflictual manner—extending either friendly or hostile behavior toward the other nation. IR scholars often look at international relations in terms of the mix of **conflict and cooperation** in relationships among nations.

The scope of the field of IR may also be defined by the *subfields* it encompasses. Some scholars treat topics such as this book's chapters (for example, international law or

international development) as subfields, but here we will reserve the term for two macro level topics. Traditionally, the study of IR has focused on questions of war and peace—the subfield of **international security** studies. The movements of armies and of diplomats, the crafting of treaties and alliances, the development and deployment of military capabilities—these are the subjects that dominated the study of IR in the past, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, and they continue to hold a central position in the field. Since the Cold War, regional conflicts and ethnic violence have received more attention, while interdisciplinary peace studies programs and feminist scholarship have sought to broaden concepts of “security” further.⁷

The subfield of **international political economy (IPE)**, a second main subfield of IR, concerns trade and financial relations among nations and focuses on how nations have cooperated politically to create and maintain institutions that regulate the flow of international economic and financial transactions. Although these topics previously centered on relations among the world’s richer nations, the widening of globalization and multilateral economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization has pushed IPE scholars to focus on developing states as well. In addition, they pay growing attention to relations between developed and developing nations (often labeled North-South relations), including such topics as economic dependency, debt, foreign aid, and technology transfer. Also newly important are problems of international environmental management and of global telecommunications. The subfield of IPE is expanding accordingly.⁸

The same principles and theories that help us understand international security (discussed in the first half of this book) also help us understand IPE (discussed in the second half). Economics is important in security affairs, and vice versa.

Theoretical knowledge accumulates by a repeated cycle of generalizing and then testing. For a given puzzle, various theories can explain the result (though none perfectly) as a case of a more general principle. Each theory also logically predicts other outcomes, and these can be tested empirically. A laboratory science, controlling all but one variable, can test theoretical predictions efficiently. IR does not have this luxury, because many variables operate simultaneously. Thus, it is especially important to think critically about IR events and consider several different theoretical explanations before deciding which (if any) provides the best explanation.

Actors and Influences



“Conflict Diamonds and the Kimberley Process”
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The principal actors in IR are the world’s governments. Scholars of IR traditionally study the decisions and acts of those governments in relation to other governments. The international stage is crowded with actors large and small that are intimately interwoven with the decisions of governments. These actors are individual leaders and citizens. They are bureaucratic agencies in foreign ministries. They are multinational corporations and terrorist groups. But the most important actors in IR are states.

⁷Neack, Laura. *Elusive Security: States First, People Last*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. Booth, Ken, ed. *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*. Rienner, 2005. Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Rienner, 1997.

⁸Cohen, Benjamin J. *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*. Princeton, 2008. Gilpin, Robert. *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton, 2001. Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Power and Interdependence*. 3rd ed. Longman, 2001.

State Actors

A **state** is a territorial entity controlled by a government and inhabited by a population. The locations of the world's states and territories are shown in the reference map at the front of this book, after the Careers section. Regional maps with greater detail appear there as well.


A state government answers to no higher authority; it exercises *sovereignty* over its territory—to make and enforce laws, to collect taxes, and so forth. This sovereignty is recognized (acknowledged) by other states through diplomatic relations and usually by membership in the United Nations (UN). The population inhabiting a state forms a *civil society* to the extent that it has developed institutions to participate in political or social life. All or part of the population that shares a group identity may consider itself a *nation* (see “Nationalism” on pp. 160–161). The state's government is a *democracy* to the extent that the government is controlled by the members of the population. In political life, and to some extent in IR scholarship, the terms *state*, *nation*, and *country* are used imprecisely, usually to refer to state governments. (Note that the word *state* in IR does not mean a state in the United States.)

With few exceptions, each state has a capital city—the seat of government from which it administers its territory—and often a single individual who acts in the name of the state. We will refer to this person simply as the “state leader.” Often he or she is the *head of government* (such as a prime minister) or the *head of state* (such as a president, or a king or queen). In some countries, such as the United States, the same person is head of state and government. In other countries, the positions of the president or royalty, or even the prime minister, are symbolic. In any case, the most powerful political figure is the one we mean by “state leader,” and these figures are the key individual actors in IR, regardless of whether these leaders are democratically elected or dictators. The state actor includes the individual leader as well as bureaucratic organizations such as foreign ministries that act in the name of the state. (What the United States calls *departments* are usually called *ministries* elsewhere. U.S. *secretaries* are *ministers* and the State Department corresponds with a *foreign ministry*.)

The **international system** is the set of relationships among the world's states, structured according to certain rules and patterns of interaction. Some such rules are explicit, some implicit. They include who is considered a member of the system, what rights and responsibilities the members have, and what kinds of actions and responses normally occur between states.

The modern international system has existed for only 500 years. Before then, people were organized into more mixed and overlapping political units such as city-states, empires, and feudal fiefs. In the past 200 years the idea has spread that *nations*—groups of people who share a sense of national identity, usually including a language and culture—should have their own states. Most large states today are such **nation-states**. But since World War II, the decolonization process in much of Asia and Africa has added many new states, some not at all nation-states. A major source of conflict and war at present is the frequent mismatch between perceived nations and actual state borders. When people identify with a nationality that their state government does not represent, they may fight

POWERS THAT BE



States are the most important actors in IR. A handful of states are considered great powers and one a “super-power.” Here, leaders of Britain, the United States, and Germany watch a British-German soccer game (overtime shootout) together during a G8 summit at Camp David, 2012.

to form their own state and thus to gain sovereignty over their territory and affairs. This substate nationalism is only one of several trends that undermine the present system of states. Others include the globalization of economic processes, the power of telecommunications, and the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

The independence of former colonies and, more recently, the breakup into smaller states of large multinational states (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia) have increased the number of states in the world. The exact total depends on the status of a number of quasi-state political entities, and it keeps changing as political units split apart or merge. The UN had 193 members in 2013.


The population of the world's states varies dramatically, from China and India with more than 1 billion people each, to microstates such as San Marino with 32,000. With the creation of many small states in recent decades, the majority of states have fewer than 10 million people each, and more than half of the rest have 10 to 50 million each. But the 17 states with populations of more than 80 million people together contain about two-thirds of the world's population.

States also differ tremendously in the size of their total annual economic activity—**Gross Domestic Product (GDP)**⁹—from the \$15 trillion U.S. economy to the economies of tiny states such as the Pacific island of Tuvalu (\$36 million). The world economy is dominated by a few states, just as world population is. Figure 1.1 lists the 15 largest countries by population and by economy. Each is an important actor in world affairs, especially the nine in the center that are largest in both population and economy.

A few of these large states possess especially great military and economic strength and influence, and are called *great powers*. They are defined and discussed in Chapter 2. The most powerful of great powers, those with truly global influence, have been called *superpowers*. This term generally meant the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and now refers to the United States alone.

Some other political entities are often referred to as states or countries although they are not formally recognized as states. Taiwan is the most important of these. It operates independently in practice but is claimed by China (a claim recognized formally by outside powers) and is not a UN member. Formal colonies and possessions still exist; their status may change in the future. They include Puerto Rico (U.S.), Bermuda (British), Martinique (French), French Guiana, the Netherlands Antilles (Dutch), the Falkland Islands (British), and Guam (U.S.). Hong Kong reverted from British to Chinese rule in 1997 and retains a somewhat separate identity under China's "one country, two systems" formula. The status of the Vatican (Holy See) in Rome is ambiguous, as is Palestine, which in 2012 joined the Vatican as the UN's only *nonmember observer states*. Including such territorial entities with states brings the world total to about 200 state or quasi-state actors. Other would-be states such as Kurdistan (Iraq), Abkhazia (Georgia), and Somaliland (Somalia) may fully control the territory they claim but are not internationally recognized.

⁹GDP is the total of goods and services produced by a nation; it is very similar to the Gross National Product (GNP). Such data are difficult to compare across nations with different currencies, economic systems, and levels of development. In particular, comparisons of GDP in capitalist and socialist economies, or in rich and poor countries, should be treated cautiously. GDP data used in this book are mostly from the World Bank. GDP data are adjusted through time and across countries for "purchasing-power parity" (how much a given amount of money can buy). See Summers, Robert, and Alan Heston. The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950–1988. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106 (2), 1991: 327–68. GDP and population data are for 2008 unless otherwise noted.

FIGURE 1.1 Largest Countries, 2011–2012

Note: Left and center columns listed in population order, right column in GDP order. GDP calculated by purchasing parity.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency. *World Factbook*. GDP estimates for 2011, population 2012.

Nonstate Actors


National governments may be the most important actors in IR, but they are strongly influenced by a variety of **nonstate actors** (see Table 1.2). These actors are also called *transnational actors* when they operate across international borders.

First, states often take actions through, within, or in the context of **intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)**—organizations whose members are national governments. IGOs fulfill a variety of functions and vary in size from just a few states to virtually the whole UN membership. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the World Trade Organization (WTO), military alliances such as NATO, and political groupings such as the African Union (AU) are all IGOs.

Another type of transnational actor, **nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)**, are private organizations, some of considerable size and resources. Increasingly NGOs are being recognized, in the UN and other forums, as legitimate actors along with states, though not equal to them. Some of these groups have a political purpose, some a humanitarian one, some an economic or technical one. Sometimes NGOs combine efforts through transnational advocacy networks.¹⁰ There is no single pattern to NGOs.

¹⁰Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Cornell, 1998. Batliwala, Srilatha, and L. David Brown. *Transnational Civil Society: An Introduction*. Kumarian, 2006.

IN THE ACTION



Nonstate actors participate in IR alongside states, although generally in less central roles. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are becoming increasingly active in IR. Here the singer and activist Bono helps present an Amnesty International award to Burma's Aung San Suu Kyi, 2012.

Together, IGOs and NGOs are referred to as international organizations (IOs).¹¹ By one count there are more than 25,000 NGOs and 5,000 IGOs. IOs are discussed in detail in Chapters 7 and 10.

Multinational corporations (MNCs) are companies that span multiple countries. The interests of a large company doing business globally do not correspond with any one state's interests. MNCs often control greater resources, and operate internationally with greater efficiency, than many small states. They may prop up (or even create) friendly foreign governments, as the United Fruit Company did in the "banana republics" of Central America a century ago. But MNCs also provide poor states with much-needed foreign investment and tax revenues. MNCs in turn depend on states to provide protection, well-regulated markets, and a stable political environment. MNCs as international actors receive special attention in Chapters 9 and 13.

Various other nonstate actors interact with states, IOs, and MNCs. For example, the terrorist attacks since September 11, 2001, have demonstrated the increasing power that technology gives terrorists as

nonstate actors. Just as Greenpeace can travel to a remote location and then beam video of its environmental actions there to the world, so too can al Qaeda place suicide bombers in world cities, coordinate their operations and finances through the Internet and the

TABLE 1.2 Types of Nonstate Actors

| Type | Who Are They? | Examples |
|-------------------|---|---|
| IGOs ^a | Intergovernmental Organizations | Members are national governments United Nations, NATO, Arab League |
| NGOs ^a | Nongovernmental Organizations | Members are individuals and groups Amnesty International, Lions Clubs, Red Cross |
| MNCs | Multinational Corporations | Companies that span borders ExxonMobil, Toyota, Wal-Mart |
| Others | Individuals, Cities, Constituencies, etc. | Bono, Iraqi Kurdistan, al Qaeda |

^aNote: IGOs and NGOs together make up International Organizations (IOs).

Source: IGO and NGO. Copyrighted by Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, Published by Pearson Education, Upper Saddle River, NJ

¹¹Armstrong, David, Lorna Lloyd, and John Redmond. *International Organization in World Politics*. Palgrave, 2003.

global banking system, and reach a global audience with videotaped appeals. "Global reach," once an exclusive capability of great powers, now is available to many others, for better or worse.

Some nonstate actors are *substate actors*: they exist within one country but either influence that country's foreign policy or operate internationally, or both. For instance, the state of Ohio is entirely a U.S. entity but operates an International Trade Division to promote exports and foreign investment, with offices in Belgium, Japan, China, Canada, Israel, India, Australia, and Mexico. The actions of substate economic actors—companies, consumers, workers, investors—help create the context of economic activity against which international political events play out, and within which governments must operate.

In this world of globalization, of substate actors and transnational actors, states are still important. But to some extent they are being gradually pushed aside as companies, groups, and individuals deal ever more directly with each other across borders, and as the world economy becomes globally integrated. Now more than ever, IR extends beyond the interactions of national governments.

Both state and nonstate actors are strongly affected by the revolution in information technologies now under way. The new information-intensive world promises to reshape international relations profoundly. Technological change dramatically affects actors' relative capabilities and even preferences. Telecommunications and computerization allow economics, politics, and culture alike to operate on a global scale as never before. The ramifications of information technology for various facets of IR will be developed in each chapter of this book.

Levels of Analysis

The many actors involved in IR contribute to the complexity of competing explanations and theories. One way scholars of IR have sorted out this multiplicity of influences, actors, and processes is to categorize them into different *levels of analysis* (see Table 1.3). A level of analysis is a perspective on IR based on a set of similar actors or processes that suggests possible explanations to "why" questions. IR scholars have proposed various level-of-analysis schemes, most often with three main levels (and sometimes a few sublevels between).¹²

The *individual* level of analysis concerns the perceptions, choices, and actions of individual human beings. Great leaders influence the course of history, as do individual citizens, thinkers, soldiers, and voters. Without Lenin, it is said, there might well have been no Soviet Union. If a few more college students had voted for Nixon rather than Kennedy in the razor-close 1960 election, the Cuban Missile Crisis might have ended differently. The study of foreign policy decision making, discussed in Chapter 3, pays special attention to individual-level explanations of IR outcomes because of the importance of psychological factors in the decision-making process.

The *domestic* (or *state* or *societal*) level of analysis concerns the aggregations of individuals within states that influence state actions in the international arena. Such aggregations include interest groups, political organizations, and government agencies. These groups operate differently (with different international effects) in different kinds of societies and states. For instance, democracies and dictatorships may act differently from one another, and democracies may act differently in an election year

¹² Singer, J. David. The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. *World Politics* 14 (1), 1961: 77–92. Waltz, Kenneth. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. Rev. ed. Columbia, 2001.

TABLE 1.3 Levels of Analysis

Many influences affect the course of international relations. Levels of analysis provide a framework for categorizing these influences and thus for suggesting various explanations of international events. Examples include:

| Global Level | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| North-South gap | Religious fundamentalism | Information revolution |
| World regions | Terrorism | Global telecommunications |
| European imperialism | World environment | Worldwide scientific and business communities |
| Norms | Technological change | |
| Interstate Level | | |
| Power | Wars | Diplomacy |
| Balance of power | Treaties | Summit meetings |
| Alliance formation and dissolution | Trade agreements | Bargaining |
| | IGOs | Reciprocity |
| Domestic Level | | |
| Nationalism | Dictatorship | Gender |
| Ethnic conflict | Domestic coalitions | Economic sectors and industries |
| Type of government | Political parties and elections | Military-industrial complex |
| Democracy | Public opinion | Foreign policy bureaucracies |
| Individual Level | | |
| Great leaders | Psychology of perception and decision | Citizens' participation (voting, rebellling, going to war, etc.) |
| Crazy leaders | Learning | |
| Decision making in crises | Assassinations, accidents of history | |

from the way they act at other times. The politics of ethnic conflict and nationalism, bubbling up from within states, plays an increasingly important role in the relations among states. Within governments, foreign policy agencies often fight bureaucratic battles over policy decisions.

The *interstate* (or *international* or *systemic*) level of analysis concerns the influence of the international system upon outcomes. This level of analysis therefore focuses on the interactions of states themselves, without regard to their internal makeup or the particular individuals who lead them. This level pays attention to states' relative power positions in the international system and the interactions (trade, for example) among them. It has been traditionally the most important of the levels of analysis.

To these three levels can be added a fourth, the *global* level of analysis, which seeks to explain international outcomes in terms of global trends and forces that transcend the interactions of states themselves.¹³ The evolution of human technology, of certain worldwide beliefs, and of humans' relationship to the natural environment are all processes at

¹³North, Robert C. *War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis*. Westview, 1990. Dower, Nigel. *An Introduction to Global Citizenship*. Edinburgh, 2003.

the global level that reach down to influence international relations. The global level is also increasingly the focus of IR scholars studying transnational integration through worldwide scientific, technical, and business communities (see Chapter 10). Another pervasive global influence is the lingering effect of historical European imperialism—Europe's conquest of Latin America, Asia, and Africa (see "History of Imperialism, 1500–2000" in Chapter 12).

Levels of analysis offer different sorts of explanations for international events. For example, many possible explanations exist for the 2003 U.S.-led war against Iraq. At the individual level, the war could be attributed to Saddam Hussein's gamble that he could defeat the forces arrayed against him, or to President Bush's desire to remove a leader he personally deemed threatening. At the domestic level, the war could be attributed to the rise of the powerful neoconservative faction that convinced the Bush administration and Americans that Saddam was a threat to U.S. security in a post-September 11 world. At the interstate level, the war might be attributed to the predominance of U.S. power. With no state willing to back Iraq militarily, the United States (as the largest global military power) was free to attack Iraq without fear of a large-scale military response. Finally, at the global level, the war might be attributable to a global fear of terrorism, or even a clash between Islam and the West.

Although IR scholars often focus their study mainly on one level of analysis, other levels bear on a problem simultaneously. There is no single correct level for a given "why" question. Rather, levels of analysis help suggest multiple explanations and approaches to consider in explaining an event. They remind scholars and students to look beyond the immediate and superficial aspects of an event to explore the possible influences of more distant causes. Note that the processes at higher levels tend to operate more slowly than those on the lower levels. Individuals go in and out of office often; the structure of the international system changes rarely.

Globalization

Globalization encompasses many trends, including expanded international trade, telecommunications, monetary coordination, multinational corporations, technical and scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges of new types and scales, migration and refugee flows, and relations between the world's rich and poor countries. Although globalization clearly is very important, it is also rather vaguely defined and not well explained by any one theory. One popular conception of globalization is as "the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life. . . ." ¹⁴ But at least three conceptions of this process compete. ¹⁵

One view sees globalization as the fruition of liberal economic principles. A global marketplace has brought growth and prosperity (not to all countries but to those most integrated with the global market). This economic process has made traditional states

¹⁴Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford, 1999: 2. Held, David, and Anthony McGrew. *Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide*. Polity, 2007.

¹⁵Friedman, Thomas L. *The World Is Flat*. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007. Stiglitz, Joseph E. *Globalization and Its Discontents*. Norton, 2002. Drezner, Daniel W. *All Politics Is Global*. Princeton, 2008. Rudra, Nita. *Globalization and the Race to the Bottom in Developing Countries: Who Really Gets Hurt?* Cambridge, 2008. Kapstein, Ethan B. *Economic Justice in an Unfair World: Toward a Normal Playing Field*. Princeton, 2007. Cusimano, Maryann K. *Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda*. Palgrave, 1999.

THINK GLOBALLY


As the world economy becomes more integrated, markets and production are becoming global in scope. This Hong Kong container port ships goods to and from all over the world, 2008.

obsolete as economic units. States are thus losing authority to supranational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU), and to transnational actors such as MNCs and NGOs. The values of technocrats and elite, educated citizens in liberal democracies are becoming global values, reflecting an emerging global civilization. The old North-South division is seen as less important, because the global South is moving in divergent directions depending on countries' and regions' integration with world markets.

A second perspective is skeptical of these claims about globalization. These skeptics note that the world's major economies are no more integrated today than before World War I (when British hegemony provided a common set of expectations and institutions). The skeptics also doubt that regional and geographic distinctions such as the North-South divide are disappearing in favor of a single global market. Rather, they see the North-South gap as increasing

with globalization. Also, the economic integration of states may be leading not to a single world free trade zone, but to distinct and rival regional blocs in America, Europe, and Asia. The supposed emerging world civilization is disproved by the fragmenting of larger units (such as the Soviet Union) into smaller ones along lines of language, religion, and other such cultural factors.

A third school of thought sees globalization as more profound than the skeptics believe, yet more uncertain than the view of supporters of liberal economics.¹⁶ These "transformationalists" see state sovereignty as being eroded by the EU, the WTO, and other new institutions, so that sovereignty is no longer an absolute but just one of a spectrum of bargaining leverages held by states. The bargaining itself increasingly involves nonstate actors. Thus globalization diffuses authority. State power is not so much strengthened or weakened by globalization, but transformed to operate in new contexts with new tools.

While scholars debate these conceptions of globalization, popular debates focus on the growing power of large corporations operating globally, the disruptive costs associated with joining world markets (for example, job loss and environmental impacts), the perception of growing disparities between the rich and the poor, and the collusion of national governments in these wrongs through their participation in IOs such as the

¹⁶Rosenau, James N. *Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization*. Princeton, 2003.

WTO and the IMF.¹⁷ Policies to expand free trade are a central focus of antiglobalization protesters (see pp. 313–314). Street protests have turned host cities into besieged fortresses in Seattle (1999); Washington, D.C. (2000 IMF and World Bank meetings); Quebec (2001 summit working toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas); and Genoa, Italy (2001 G8 summit), where protesters engaged police in battles that killed one person. The key 2001 WTO meeting to launch a new trade round was held in Qatar, where protesters had little access. At the 2003 WTO meeting in Cancun, Mexico, thousands of protesters marched against the talks and the economic elites conducting them, but were kept away from the WTO conference center. At the 2005 Hong Kong WTO meeting, protesters blocked nearby roads and some even tried to swim across Hong Kong harbor to disrupt the meeting.

Just as scholars disagree on conceptions of globalization, so do protesters disagree on their goals and tactics. Union members from the global North want to stop globalization from shipping their jobs south. But workers in impoverished countries in the global South may desperately want those jobs as a first step toward decent wages and working conditions (relative to other options in their countries). Window-smashing anarchists meanwhile steal media attention from environmentalists seeking to amend the trade agenda. Thus, neither globalization nor the backlash to it is simple.

Globalization is changing both international security and IPE, as we will see in the coming chapters, but it is changing IPE more quickly and profoundly than security. The coming chapters address a broad range of topics, each affected by globalization. Chapter 4 shows how nonstate actors influence foreign policies of states. Chapter 7 discusses global institutions, international law, and human rights, all of growing importance as globalization continues. Chapters 8 and 9 look at economic globalization in trade, finance, and business, where globalization's influences are most apparent. Chapter 10 considers the information technology side of globalization, as the world becomes wired in new ways. Chapter 11 discusses the global environment and examines how increasing interaction through globalization influences our physical environment. Chapters 12 and 13 cover the global North-South divide, which is central to the concept of globalization.

The rest of this chapter takes up two contextual aspects of globalization that shape the issue areas discussed in subsequent chapters—(1) the relations among the world's major regions, especially the rich North and poor South; and (2) the evolution of the international system over the past century.

Global Geography


To highlight the insights afforded by a global level of analysis, this book divides the world into nine regions. These *world regions* differ from each other in the number of states they contain and in each region's particular mix of cultures, geographical realities, and languages. But each represents a geographical corner of the world, and together they reflect the overall larger divisions of the world.

The global **North-South gap** between the relatively rich industrialized countries of the North and the relatively poor countries of the South is the most important

¹⁷Broad, Robin. *Citizen Backlash to Economic Globalization*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. Milani, Brian. *Designing the Green Economy: The Post-Industrial Alternative to Corporate Globalization*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

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FIGURE 1.2 Nine Regions of the World



geographical element at the global level of analysis. The regions used in this book have been drawn so as to separate (with a few exceptions) the rich countries from the poor ones. The North includes both the West (the rich countries of North America, Europe, and Japan) and the old East, including the former Soviet Union (now Russia) and the *Commonwealth of Independent States* (CIS), a loose confederation of former Soviet republics excluding the Baltic states.¹⁸ The South includes Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and much of Asia. The South is often called the *third world* (third after the West and East)—a term that is still widely used despite the second world's collapse. Countries in the South are also referred to as “developing” countries or “less-developed” countries (LDCs), in contrast to the “developed” countries of the North. The world regions are shown in Figure 1.2.

Several criteria beyond income levels help distinguish major geographically contiguous regions. Countries with similar economic levels, cultures, and languages have been kept together where possible. States with a history of interaction, including historical empires or trading zones, are also placed together in a region. Finally, countries that might possibly unify in the future—notably South Korea with North Korea, and China with Taiwan—are kept in the same region. Of course, no scheme works perfectly, and some states, such as Turkey, are pulled toward two regions.

Most of these regions correspond with commonly used geographical names, but a few notes may help. *East Asia* refers to China, Japan, and Korea. *Southeast Asia* refers to countries from Burma through Indonesia and the Philippines. Russia is considered a European state although a large section (Siberia) is in Asia. The *Pacific Rim* usually means East and Southeast Asia, Siberia, and the Pacific coast of North America and Latin America.¹⁹ *South Asia* only sometimes includes parts of Southeast Asia. Narrow definitions of the *Middle East* exclude both North Africa and Turkey. The *Balkans* are the states of southeastern Europe, bounded by Slovenia, Romania, and Greece.

Table 1.4 shows GDP for each of the world's countries, organized by region. Table 1.5 shows the approximate population and economic size (GDP) of each region in relation to the world as a whole. As the table indicates, income levels per capita are, overall, more than five times as high in the North as in the South. *The North contains only 20 percent of the world's people but 55 percent of its goods and services.* The other 80 percent of the world's people, in the South, have only 45 percent of the goods and services.

Within the global North, Russia and the CIS states lag behind in income levels, having suffered declines in the 1990s. In the global South, the Middle East, Latin America, and (more recently) China have achieved somewhat higher income levels than have Africa and South Asia, which remain extremely poor. Even in the somewhat higher-income regions, income is distributed quite unevenly and many people remain very poor. Note that more than half of the world's population lives in the densely populated (and poor) regions of South Asia and China. IR scholars have no single explanation of the huge North-South income gap (see Chapter 12).

¹⁸Note that geographical designations such as the “West” and the “Middle East” are European-centered. From Korea, for example, China and Russia are to the west, and Japan and the United States are to the east. On world-level geography, see Kidron, Michael, Ronald Segal, and Angela Wilson. *The State of the World Atlas*. 5th ed. Penguin, 1995. Boyd, Andrew, and Joshua Comenetz. *An Atlas of World Affairs*. McGraw-Hill, 2007.

¹⁹Ikenberry, G. John, and Michael Mastanduno. *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*. Columbia, 2003. Pempel, T. J. *Remapping East Asia*. Cornell, 2005.